Journal article
Cognitive impenetrability of early vision does not imply cognitive impenetrability of perception
The Behavioral and brain sciences, Vol.22(3), pp.385-386
06/1999
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X99442025
Abstract
Pylyshyn argues that early vision is cognitively impenetrable,
and therefore – contrary to knowledge-based theories of
perception – that perception is noncontinuous with cognition.
Those processes that are included in “early vision,”
however, represent at best only one component of perception, and it is
important that it is not the component with which most knowledge-based
theories are concerned. Pylyshyn's analysis should be taken as a
possible source of refinement of knowledge-based theories of
perception, rather than as a condemnation of them.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Cognitive impenetrability of early vision does not imply cognitive impenetrability of perception
- Creators
- Cathleen M Moore - Department of Psychology, Penn State University, University Park, PA 16802 cmm15@psu.edu gandalf.la.psu.edu/cathleen
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- The Behavioral and brain sciences, Vol.22(3), pp.385-386
- DOI
- 10.1017/S0140525X99442025
- ISSN
- 0140-525X
- eISSN
- 1469-1825
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Number of pages
- 2
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 06/1999
- Academic Unit
- Psychological and Brain Sciences; Injury Prevention Research Center
- Record Identifier
- 9984213417402771
Metrics
21 Record Views