Journal article
Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion
American economic journal. Microeconomics, Vol.6(2), pp.247-278
05/01/2014
DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.2.247
Abstract
We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play if players share an understanding that cheating will be punished. Consistent with communication acting as a coordinating device, credible preplay threats to punish cheating are the most effective message to facilitate collusion. Promises to collude also improve cooperation. Credible threats do not occur in a treatment with a limited message space that permits threats of punishment. Contrary to some theoretical predictions, renegotiation possibilities facilitate collusion.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion
- Creators
- David J. Cooper - Florida State Univ, Dept Econ, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USAKai-Uwe Kuehn - Univ Michigan, Dept Econ, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- American economic journal. Microeconomics, Vol.6(2), pp.247-278
- DOI
- 10.1257/mic.6.2.247
- ISSN
- 1945-7669
- eISSN
- 1945-7685
- Publisher
- Amer Economic Assoc
- Number of pages
- 32
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 05/01/2014
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984420937202771