Journal article
Communication in Coordination Games
The Quarterly journal of economics, Vol.107(2), pp.739-771
05/01/1992
DOI: 10.2307/2118488
Abstract
We present experimental evidence on nonbinding, preplay communication in bilateral coordination games. To evaluate the effect of “cheap talk,” we consider two communication structures (one-way and two-way communication) and two types of coordination games (one with a cooperative strategy and a second in which one strategy is less “risky”). In games with a cooperative strategy, one-way communication increases play of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium relative to the no communication baseline; two-way communication does not always decrease the frequency of coordination failures. In the second type of game, two-way communication always leads to the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, while one-way communication does not.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Communication in Coordination Games
- Creators
- Russell Cooper - Boston UniversityDouglas V. DeJong - University of IowaRobert Forsythe - Department of Economics, University of IowaThomas W. Ross - Carleton University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- The Quarterly journal of economics, Vol.107(2), pp.739-771
- DOI
- 10.2307/2118488
- ISSN
- 0033-5533
- eISSN
- 1531-4650
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Number of pages
- 33
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 05/01/1992
- Academic Unit
- Accounting
- Record Identifier
- 9984962893502771
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