Journal article
Complementarity and diagonal dominance in discounted stochastic games
Annals of operations research, Vol.114(1-4), pp.39-56
08/01/2002
DOI: 10.1023/A:1021097716583
Abstract
We consider discounted stochastic games characterized by monotonicity, supermodularity and diagonal dominance assumptions on the reward functions and the transition law. A thorough novel discussion of the scope and limitations of this class of games is provided. Existence of a Markov-stationary equilibrium for the infinite-horizon game, proved by Curtat ( 1996), is summarized. Uniqueness of Markov equilibrium and dominance solvability of the finite-horizon game are established. In both cases, the equilibrium strategies and the corresponding value functions are nondecreasing Liptschitz-continuous functions of the state vector. Some specific economic applications are discussed.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Complementarity and diagonal dominance in discounted stochastic games
- Creators
- R Amir - Congress of Racial Equality
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Annals of operations research, Vol.114(1-4), pp.39-56
- Publisher
- Springer Nature
- DOI
- 10.1023/A:1021097716583
- ISSN
- 0254-5330
- eISSN
- 1572-9338
- Number of pages
- 18
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 08/01/2002
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380377802771
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