Journal article
Compromise Leadership: Competing Board Subgroups and the Appointment of a Newcomer Chair
Journal of management
11/17/2025
DOI: 10.1177/01492063251381323
Abstract
Prior research suggests that firm-specific human capital is important in enabling board chairs to effectively lead their boards in their oversight duties. Despite this, some boards appoint newcomer directors to the chair position. This paper seeks to explain why. Building on power circulation and faultline theories, we posit that boards characterized by strongly divided subgroups with none dominant over the board may have difficulty in agreeing on promoting a director from among their ranks to the chair position, and instead select a board newcomer as a compromise solution. We further argue that this will be moderated by factors that affect either the power dynamics or the degree of contestation on the board. Analyses on a sample of 2,199 board chair appointments at S&P 1500 firms between the years 2001 and 2017 support our hypotheses.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Compromise Leadership: Competing Board Subgroups and the Appointment of a Newcomer Chair
- Creators
- Robert Langan - Universitat Ramon LlullRyan Krause - University of IowaMarkus Menz - International Institute for Management Development
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of management
- DOI
- 10.1177/01492063251381323
- ISSN
- 0149-2063
- eISSN
- 1557-1211
- Publisher
- Sage
- Number of pages
- 26
- Grant note
- 185173 / Swiss National Science Foundation; Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF)
- Language
- English
- Electronic publication date
- 11/17/2025
- Academic Unit
- Management and Entrepreneurship
- Record Identifier
- 9985034032702771
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