Journal article
Consistent Depth of Reasoning in Level-k Models
American economic journal. Microeconomics, Vol.16(4), pp.40-76
11/01/2024
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210237
Abstract
Level-k models often assume that individuals employ a fixed depth of reasoning across different games. We study this assumption by having subjects make choices in five classes of games chosen to identify inconsistent depth of reasoning. We demonstrate that depth of reasoning is pervasively inconsistent, changing both within and between classes of games. We show that this cannot easily be explained by factors such as subject confusion, changing beliefs about others' depth of reasoning, stochastic choice, model misspecification, changing incentives, or low cognitive ability. We develop a simple model incorporating ambiguity aversion that predicts inconsistent depth of reasoning.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Consistent Depth of Reasoning in Level-k Models
- Creators
- David CooperEnrique FatasAntonio MoralesShi Qi
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- American economic journal. Microeconomics, Vol.16(4), pp.40-76
- DOI
- 10.1257/mic.20210237
- ISSN
- 1945-7669
- eISSN
- 1945-7685
- Publisher
- AMER ECONOMIC ASSOC
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 11/01/2024
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984736747602771
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