Journal article
Continuous Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transitions
Games and economic behavior, Vol.15(2), pp.111-131
08/01/1996
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0061
Abstract
We consider a discounted stochastic game of common-property capital accumulation with nonsymmetric players, bounded one-period extraction capacities, and a transition law satisfying a general strong convexity condition. We show that the infinite-horizon problem has a Markov-stationary (subgame-perfect) equilibrium and that every finite-horizon truncation has auniqueMarkovian equilibrium, both in consumption functions which arecontinuous and nondecreasingand have all slopes bounded above by 1. Unlike previous results in strategic dynamic models, these properties are reminiscent of the corresponding optimal growth model.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Codes: C73, O41, Q20.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Continuous Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transitions
- Creators
- Rabah Amir - WZB Berlin Social Science Center
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Games and economic behavior, Vol.15(2), pp.111-131
- Publisher
- Elsevier Inc
- DOI
- 10.1006/game.1996.0061
- ISSN
- 0899-8256
- eISSN
- 1090-2473
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 08/01/1996
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380473002771
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