Journal article
Convergence and Approximation Results for Non-Cooperative Bayesian Games: Learning Theorems
Economic theory, Vol.4(6), pp.843-857
01/01/1994
DOI: 10.1007/BF01213815
Abstract
Let T denote a continuous time horizon and$\{G^{t}\colon t\in T\}$be a net (generalized sequence) of Bayesian games. We show that: (i) if$\{x^{t}\colon t\in T\}$is a net of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) strategies for$G^{t}$, we can extract a subsequence which converges to a limit full information BNE strategy for a one shot limit full information Bayesian game. (ii) If$\{x^{t}\colon t\in T\}$is a net of approximate or$\varepsilon _{t}\text{-}{\rm BNE}$strategies for the game$G^{t}$we can still extract a subsequence which converges to the one shot limit full information equilibrium BNE strategy. (iii) Given a limit full information BNE strategy of a one shot limit full information Bayesian game, we can find a net of$\varepsilon _{t}\text{-}{\rm BNE}$strategies$\{x^{t}\colon t\in T\}$in$\{G^{t}\colon t\in T\}$which converges to the limit full information BNE strategy of the one shot game.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Convergence and Approximation Results for Non-Cooperative Bayesian Games: Learning Theorems
- Creators
- Leonidas C. Koutsougeras - University of Illinois Urbana-ChampaignNicholas C. Yannelis - University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economic theory, Vol.4(6), pp.843-857
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- DOI
- 10.1007/BF01213815
- ISSN
- 0938-2259
- eISSN
- 1432-0479
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 01/01/1994
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380440302771
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