Journal article
Convergence and stability of Walrasian equilibrium under asymmetric information
Pure and applied functional analysis, Vol.6(5), pp.961-978
01/01/2021
Abstract
We study the evolution of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in a sequence of asymmetric information economies. Equilibrium allocations generate additional information that changes the information structures over time. Agents are bounded rational in the sense that a small error within maximization is allowed. We address the following: (i) given a sequence of equilibrium in each period, there is a subsequence that converges to an equilibrium for the limit full information economy, (ii) any equilibrium in the limit full information economy can be reached by a sequence of approximate equilibria.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Convergence and stability of Walrasian equilibrium under asymmetric information
- Creators
- Marialaura Pesce - University of Naples Federico IINicholas C Yannelis - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Pure and applied functional analysis, Vol.6(5), pp.961-978
- ISSN
- 2189-3756
- eISSN
- 2189-3764
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 01/01/2021
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984528124102771
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