Journal article
Cooperation vs. Competition in R&D: the Role of Stability of Equilibrium
Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria), Vol.67(1), pp.63-73
1998
DOI: 10.1007/BF01227763
Abstract
We consider a model in which firms first choose process R&D expenditures and then compete in an output market. We show the symmetric equilibrium under R&D competition is sometimes unstable, in which case two asymmetric equilibria must also exist. For the latter, we find, in contrast to the literature that total profits are sometimes higher with R& D competition than with research joint venture cartelization (due to the cost asymmetry of the resulting duopoly in the noncooperative case). Furthermore, these equilibria provide another instance of R&D-induced firm heterogeneity.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Cooperation vs. Competition in R&D: the Role of Stability of Equilibrium
- Creators
- Rabah Amir - Odense UniversityJohn Wooders - Odense University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of economics (Vienna, Austria), Vol.67(1), pp.63-73
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- DOI
- 10.1007/BF01227763
- ISSN
- 0931-8658
- eISSN
- 1617-7134
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 1998
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380542102771
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