Journal article
Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
Games and economic behavior, Vol.12(2), pp.187-218
02/01/1996
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0013
Abstract
This paper investigates cooperative play in prisoner's dilemma games by designing an experiment to evaluate the ability of two leading theories of observed cooperation: reputation building and altruism. We analyze both one-shot and finitely repeated games to gauge the importance of these theories. We conclude that neither altruism nor reputation building alone can explain our observations. The reputation model is inconsistent with play in both one-shots and finitely repeated games while the model with altruism is unable to explain observed play in the finitely repeated games.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
- Creators
- Russell Cooper - Boston UniversityDouglas V. Dejong - University of IowaRobert Forsythe - University of IowaThomas W. Ross - University of British Columbia
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Games and economic behavior, Vol.12(2), pp.187-218
- DOI
- 10.1006/game.1996.0013
- ISSN
- 0899-8256
- eISSN
- 1090-2473
- Number of pages
- 32
- Grant note
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (http://data.elsevier.com/vocabulary/SciValFunders/501100000155) University of Iowa (http://data.elsevier.com/vocabulary/SciValFunders/100008893) National Science Foundation (http://data.elsevier.com/vocabulary/SciValFunders/100000001)
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 02/01/1996
- Academic Unit
- Economics; Accounting
- Record Identifier
- 9984962895902771
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