Journal article
Coordination and transfer
Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association, Vol.21(3), pp.487-512
09/01/2018
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-017-9521-8
Abstract
We study the ability of subjects to transfer principles between related coordination games. Subjects play a class of order statistic coordination games closely related to the well-known minimum (or weak-link) and median games (Van Huyck et al. in Am Econ Rev 80:234–248,
1990
, Q J Econ 106(3):885–910,
1991
). When subjects play a random sequence of games with differing order statistics, play is less sensitive to the order statistic than when a fixed order statistic is used throughout. This is consistent with the prediction of a simple learning model with transfer. If subjects play a series of similar stag hunt games, play converges to the payoff dominant equilibrium when a convention emerges, replicating the main result of Rankin et al. (Games Econ Behav 32:315–337,
2000
). When these subjects subsequently play a random sequence of order statistic games, play is shifted towards the payoff dominant equilibrium relative to subjects without previous experience. The data is consistent with subjects absorbing a general principle, play of the payoff dominant equilibrium, and applying it in a new related setting.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Coordination and transfer
- Creators
- David J. Cooper - Department of Economics, Florida State UniversityJohn Van Huyck - Texas A&M University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association, Vol.21(3), pp.487-512
- Publisher
- Springer US
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10683-017-9521-8
- ISSN
- 1386-4157
- eISSN
- 1573-6938
- Grant note
- SES-0214310 / National Science Foundation (http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100000001)
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 09/01/2018
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984420938302771
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