Journal article
Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities
Economic theory bulletin, Vol.11(1), pp.27-44
2023
DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00239-x
Abstract
It is known that the core of an economy with externalities may be empty. We consider two concepts of dominance that allow us to prove that the set formed by individually rational, Pareto optimal allocations is stable and coincides with the core that, consequently, is non-empty.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities
- Creators
- Maria Gabriella Graziano - Univ Napoli Federico II, Dipartimento Sci Econ & Stat & CSEF, Naples, ItalyClaudia Meo - Univ Napoli Federico II, Dipartimento Sci Econ & Stat, Naples, ItalyNicholas C. Yannelis - Univ Iowa, Dept Econ, Henry B Tippie Coll Business, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economic theory bulletin, Vol.11(1), pp.27-44
- Publisher
- Springer Nature
- DOI
- 10.1007/s40505-022-00239-x
- ISSN
- 2196-1085
- eISSN
- 2196-1093
- Number of pages
- 18
- Language
- English
- Electronic publication date
- 10/28/2022
- Date published
- 2023
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380721502771
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