Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell

Rabah Amir; Sergei Belkov; Igor V. Evstigneev

doi:10.1007/s11238-017-9609-9

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Journal article

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Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell

Rabah Amir, Sergei Belkov and Igor V. Evstigneev

Theory and decision, Vol.83(4), pp.457-468

12/01/2017

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-017-9609-9

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Abstract

We analyze the concept of correlated equilibrium in the framework of two-player two-strategy games. This simple framework makes it possible to clearly demonstrate the characteristic features of this concept. We develop an intuitive and easily memorizable test for equilibrium conditions and provide a complete classification of symmetric correlated equilibria in symmetric games.

Business & Economics

Economics

Mathematical Methods In Social Sciences

Social Sciences

Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods

Details

Title: Subtitle: Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell
Creators: Rabah Amir - University of Iowa
Sergei Belkov - University of Manchester
Igor V. Evstigneev - University of Manchester
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Theory and decision, Vol.83(4), pp.457-468
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-017-9609-9
ISSN: 0040-5833
eISSN: 1573-7187
Publisher: Springer Nature
Number of pages: 12
Language: English
Date published: 12/01/2017
Academic Unit: Economics
Record Identifier: 9984380453202771

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