Journal article
Cournot and Bertrand equilibria compared: substitutability, complementarity and concavity
International journal of industrial organization, Vol.19(3), pp.303-317
03/01/2001
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00043-0
Abstract
This paper assesses the view that Bertrand equilibrium is intrinsically more competitive than Cournot equilibrium. We consider an oligopoly model with linear demand, and a mixture of substitute and complementary products. Our results provide support for the conventional wisdom, and also indicate its limitations. We provide counter-examples showing that no clear-cut comparison of prices and quantities is possible without strategic complementarity in either of the two games. However, price competition is indeed more competitive according to the following criteria: lower mark-up/output ratios, larger average output, and lower average price.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Cournot and Bertrand equilibria compared: substitutability, complementarity and concavity
- Creators
- Rabah Amir - University of Southern DenmarkJim Y. Jin - Queen's University Belfast
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- International journal of industrial organization, Vol.19(3), pp.303-317
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- DOI
- 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00043-0
- ISSN
- 0167-7187
- eISSN
- 1873-7986
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 03/01/2001
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380451602771
Metrics
4 Record Views