Journal article
Customs unions and the core
Journal of international economics, Vol.19(3), pp.355-365
11/01/1985
DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(85)90042-X
Abstract
Customs union formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage countries make coalitional choices according to core theory. In the second stage optimal tariffs are determined. This yields a theory that predicts which customs unions form. An example shows that a customs union can be an equilibrium even when both member countries do better at free trade.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Customs unions and the core
- Creators
- Raymond Riezman - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of international economics, Vol.19(3), pp.355-365
- DOI
- 10.1016/0022-1996(85)90042-X
- ISSN
- 0022-1996
- eISSN
- 1873-0353
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- Number of pages
- 11
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 11/01/1985
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984963109702771
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