Journal article
Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents
Economic theory, Vol.38(2), pp.419-432
02/01/2009
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0246-3
Abstract
We provide several different generalizations of Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem by allowing for asymmetric information and a continuum of agents. The results not only extend the ones in Kim and Yannelis (J Econ Theory 77:330–353, 1977), Yannelis and Rustichini (Stud Econ Theory 2:23–48, 1991), but also new theorems are obtained which allow for a convexifying effect on aggregation (non-concavity assumption on the utility functions) and non-convex strategy sets (pure strategies). This is achieved by imposing the assumption of “many more agents than strategies” (Rustichini and Yannelis in Stud Econ Theory 1:249–265, 1991; Tourky and Yannelis in J Econ Theory 101:189–221, 2001; Podczeck in Econ Theory 22:699–725, 2003).
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Debreu’s social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents
- Creators
- Nicholas C. Yannelis - University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economic theory, Vol.38(2), pp.419-432
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00199-007-0246-3
- ISSN
- 0938-2259
- eISSN
- 1432-0479
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 02/01/2009
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380484402771
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