Journal article
Do elections delay regulatory action?
Journal of financial economics, Vol.130(2), pp.409-427
11/2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.06.010
Abstract
This paper investigates whether elections delay regulatory action against failing financial institutions by exploiting the cross-sectional and time-series heterogeneity in the exogenous electoral cycles of US insurance regulators and governors. We find causal evidence that regulators delay interventions before elections. The extent of the delay is larger for elected regulators than regulators appointed by the governor. Interventions by appointed regulators are less likely before competitive gubernatorial elections. Regulatory governance mechanisms that constrain the discretion of regulators reduce the delays of appointed regulators but not elected. Finally, we find evidence that suggests electoral delays increase the ultimate costs of failure.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Do elections delay regulatory action?
- Creators
- J. Tyler Leverty - University of Wisconsin–MadisonMartin F. Grace - Temple University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of financial economics, Vol.130(2), pp.409-427
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.06.010
- ISSN
- 0304-405X
- eISSN
- 1879-2774
- Number of pages
- 19
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 11/2018
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Record Identifier
- 9984701255402771
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