Journal article
Do managers provide misleading earnings forecasts before stock repurchases?
Financial management, Vol.50(4), pp.1013-1046
12/01/2021
DOI: 10.1111/fima.12339
Abstract
We question previous evidence that managers mislead investors into selling their stock for artificially lowered prices by releasing overly negative earnings forecasts before stock repurchases. We rely on forecast errors (forecast minus actual earnings) and show that these are insignificantly different between repurchase and matching firms. Our tests are powerful at detecting small differences and yet, across multiple subsamples, we find no statistical difference in forecast errors of repurchase and matching firms. Prior evidence of managerial misleading relied on the negative stock market reaction to management forecasts. We show that this negative reaction is observed only in the subsample where board authorization of repurchase follows management forecast. When board authorization precedes forecast, market reaction to management forecasts for repurchase firms is somewhat higher than that for matching firms. Our evidence suggests that managers are not misleading but exploiting low market prices to the advantage of their long-term shareholders.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Do managers provide misleading earnings forecasts before stock repurchases?
- Creators
- Amrita S. Nain - University of IowaAnand M. Vijh - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Financial management, Vol.50(4), pp.1013-1046
- Publisher
- Wiley
- DOI
- 10.1111/fima.12339
- ISSN
- 0046-3892
- eISSN
- 1755-053X
- Number of pages
- 34
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 12/01/2021
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Record Identifier
- 9984380436402771
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