Journal article
EPISTEMIC VIRTUES AND VICES AS ATTITUDES: IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL MEASURES AND VIRTUE INTERVENTIONS
Journal of philosophical research, Vol.47, pp.83-94
01/01/2022
DOI: 10.5840/jpr20221027195
Abstract
In this paper I remark on Tanesini's (2021) account of intellectual humility and servility as attitudes, with a focus on how this proposal intersects with the psychology literature on intellectual humility. I begin by discussing the implications this may have for empirical measures of intellectual humility, including concerns that some current measures seem to do a better job of capturing dispositional limitations-owning than virtuous intellectual humility. Additionally, I raise concerns that excluding interpersonal features and a motivation to learn from conceptualizations of intellectual humility risk vicious manifestations of intellectual humility. Finally, I build on Tanesini's (2021) ameliorative proposal centered on affirming one's values by offering some specific strategies drawn from several psychology theories. These include Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, Social Learning Theory, and the Social Contact Hypothesis.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- EPISTEMIC VIRTUES AND VICES AS ATTITUDES: IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL MEASURES AND VIRTUE INTERVENTIONS
- Creators
- Stacey E. McElroy-Heltzel - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of philosophical research, Vol.47, pp.83-94
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- DOI
- 10.5840/jpr20221027195
- ISSN
- 1053-8364
- eISSN
- 2153-7984
- Number of pages
- 12
- Grant note
- Self, Virtue, and Public Life research initiative based at the University of Oklahoma through Templeton Religion Trust
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 01/01/2022
- Academic Unit
- Psychological and Quantitative Foundations
- Record Identifier
- 9984374335802771
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