Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility in Differential Information Economies

Guangsug Hahn; Nicholas C. Yannelis

doi:10.1007/s001990050164

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Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility in Differential Information Economies

Journal article

Peer reviewed

Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility in Differential Information Economies

Guangsug Hahn and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Economic theory, Vol.10(3), pp.383-411

1997

DOI: 10.1007/s001990050164

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Abstract

We introduce several efficiency notions depending on what kind of expected utility is used (ex ante, interim, ex post) and on how agents share their private information, i.e., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, or common knowledge information, or pooled information. Moreover, we introduce several Bayesian incentive compatibility notions and identify several efficiency concepts which maintain (coalitional) Bayesian incentive compatibility.

Allocative efficiency

Economic efficiency

Economic theory

Efficiency metrics

Endowments

Expected utility

Information economy

Measurability

Trade

Utility functions

Details

Title: Subtitle: Efficiency and Incentive Compatibility in Differential Information Economies
Creators: Guangsug Hahn
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Economic theory, Vol.10(3), pp.383-411
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050164
ISSN: 0938-2259
eISSN: 1432-0479
Language: English
Date published: 1997
Academic Unit: Economics
Record Identifier: 9984380402202771

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