Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure

Jacopo Bizzotto; Benjamin Solow

doi:10.3390/g10030029

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Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure

Journal article

Open access

Peer reviewed

Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure

Jacopo Bizzotto and Benjamin Solow

Games, Vol.10(3), pp.29-17

07/06/2019

DOI: 10.3390/g10030029

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https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030029View

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Abstract

Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when candidates can target messages to specific voter groups, platforms are more likely to be inefficient. In particular, when candidates can run targeted campaigns, they commit to projects that benefit small groups even when the social cost of these projects outweigh their benefits. Our results are robust to negative advertising.

Details

Title: Subtitle: Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure
Creators: Jacopo Bizzotto
Benjamin Solow
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Games, Vol.10(3), pp.29-17
DOI: 10.3390/g10030029
ISSN: 2073-4336
eISSN: 2073-4336
Language: English
Date published: 07/06/2019
Academic Unit: Economics
Record Identifier: 9984083997802771

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