Journal article
Endogenous Timing in Two-Player Games: A Counterexample
Games and economic behavior, Vol.9(2), pp.234-237
05/01/1995
DOI: 10.1006/game.1995.1018
Abstract
This note relates to the study of Hamilton and Slutsky ((1990) Games Econ. Behav. 2, 29-46) on endogenous timing (with observable delay). It shows, via counterexample, that monotonicity of the best-reponse functions in a two-player game is not sufficient to derive predictions about the order of moves. Rather, this requires, additionally, the monotonicity of each payoff in the other player′s actions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, L10.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Endogenous Timing in Two-Player Games: A Counterexample
- Creators
- Rabah Amir - Congress of Racial Equality
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Games and economic behavior, Vol.9(2), pp.234-237
- Publisher
- Elsevier Inc
- DOI
- 10.1006/game.1995.1018
- ISSN
- 0899-8256
- eISSN
- 1090-2473
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 05/01/1995
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380423202771
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