Journal article
Entry, exit, and imperfect competition in the long run
Journal of economic theory, Vol.110(1), pp.191-203
05/01/2003
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00002-4
Abstract
An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect competition is constructed. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the general dynamic stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite-horizon equilibria. This equilibrium has a relatively simple structure characterized by two numbers per finite history. Under very general conditions, it tends to exhibit excessive entry and insufficient exit relative to a social optimum.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Entry, exit, and imperfect competition in the long run
- Creators
- Rabah Amir - UCLouvainVal E. Lambson - Brigham Young University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of economic theory, Vol.110(1), pp.191-203
- Publisher
- Elsevier Inc
- DOI
- 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00002-4
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
- eISSN
- 1095-7235
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 05/01/2003
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380490202771
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