Journal article
Equilibria and incentives in private information economies
Journal of economic theory, Vol.169, pp.474-488
05/01/2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.010
Abstract
This paper considers three solution concepts in a large private information economy, namely, Walrasian expectations equilibrium, private core, and insurance equilibrium. It shows that these three concepts coincide with each other when the agents are informationally negligible in such an economy. In contrast to the finite-agent setting, one can construct a large private information economy in which incentive compatibility fails completely in the sense that almost every agent in any Walrasian expectations equilibrium/private core/insurance equilibrium allocation has the incentive to misreport her type. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Equilibria and incentives in private information economies
- Creators
- Xiang Sun - Wuhan UniversityYeneng Sun - National University of SingaporeLei Wu - JPMorgan Chase & CoNicholas C. Yannelis - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of economic theory, Vol.169, pp.474-488
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.010
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
- eISSN
- 1095-7235
- Number of pages
- 15
- Grant note
- 11401/1/14 / NSFC; National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) SRF for ROCS, SEM; Scientific Research Foundation for the Returned Overseas Chinese Scholars R-122-000-227-112 / NUS; National University of Singapore
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 05/01/2017
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380426402771
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