Journal article
Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.61, pp.86-95
12/01/2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.08.004
Abstract
We extend the classical results on the Walras-core existence and equivalence to an ambiguous asymmetric information economy; that is, an economy where agents maximize Maximin Expected Utility (MEU). The interest of considering ambiguity arises from the fact that, in the presence of MEU decision making, there is no conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility (contrary to the Bayesian decision making). Our new modeling of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy necessitates new equilibrium notions, which are always efficient and incentive compatible. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
- Creators
- Wei He - University of IowaNicholas C. Yannelis - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of mathematical economics, Vol.61, pp.86-95
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.08.004
- ISSN
- 0304-4068
- eISSN
- 1873-1538
- Number of pages
- 10
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 12/01/2015
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380549602771
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