Journal article
Evidence on the equivalence of the strategic and extensive form representation of games
Journal of economic theory, Vol.110(2), pp.290-308
06/01/2003
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00040-1
Abstract
Our experiment tests whether strategically equivalent representations of games produce equivalent behavior when actually played. We examine representative members of the class of generic 2×2 extensive form games of perfect information and the equivalent strategic form games. Systematic differences exist between subjects' choices in the strategic and extensive form representations. These differences cannot be attributed to differences in subjects' ability to do backwards induction, in the salience of interpersonal preferences, or in optimization premiums between the two game forms. Instead, subjects in the extensive form are consistently more likely to allow the other player to make a meaningful choice. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Evidence on the equivalence of the strategic and extensive form representation of games
- Creators
- David CooperJohn Van Huyck
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of economic theory, Vol.110(2), pp.290-308
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc
- DOI
- 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00040-1
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
- eISSN
- 1095-7235
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 06/01/2003
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984420843302771
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