Journal article
Existence and fairness of value allocation without convex preferences
Journal of economic theory, Vol.31(2), pp.283-292
12/01/1983
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(83)90078-9
Abstract
Shafer (
Econometrica,
48 (1980), 467–476) proved that in a finite exchange economy value allocations exist, provided that each agent has convex, complete, transitive, compact and monotone preferences. However, if preferences are not convex, then value allocations may not exist. To remedy this difficulty we enlarge the set of value allocations by introducing the concept of approximate value allocations, and show that in a finite exchange economy approximate value allocations exist, even if preferences are not convex, or compact, or monotone. This value existence result can be used to provide a very general value existence theorem for a sequence of finite economies. Further, we show that value allocations may discriminate in favor of or against a coalition of agents.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Existence and fairness of value allocation without convex preferences
- Creators
- Nicholas C Yannelis - Wayne State University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of economic theory, Vol.31(2), pp.283-292
- Publisher
- Elsevier Inc
- DOI
- 10.1016/0022-0531(83)90078-9
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
- eISSN
- 1095-7235
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 12/01/1983
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380417602771
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