Journal article
Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games
Journal of economic theory, Vol.162, pp.181-194
03/01/2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.009
Abstract
We provide easily-verifiable sufficient conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game to guarantee the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We allow players' payoff functions to be discontinuous in actions, and illustrate the usefulness of our results via an example of an all-pay auction with general tie-breaking rules which cannot be handled by extant results. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games
- Creators
- Wei He - University of IowaNicholas C. Yannelis - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of economic theory, Vol.162, pp.181-194
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.009
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
- eISSN
- 1095-7235
- Number of pages
- 14
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 03/01/2016
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380512402771
Metrics
3 Record Views