Logo image
FRIENDSHIP AND THE GROUNDS OF REASONS
Journal article   Open access   Peer reviewed

FRIENDSHIP AND THE GROUNDS OF REASONS

Diane Jeske
Les ateliers de l'éthique, Vol.3(1), pp.61-69
2008
DOI: 10.7202/1044605ar
url
https://doi.org/10.7202/1044605arView
Published (Version of record) Open Access

Abstract

Friendship and other intimate relationships have created difficulties for moral philosophers. While morality seems to require us to remain impartial between persons, friendship seems to generate demands or obligations of partiality toward our intimates. But the difficulty can be removed once we cease to focus on categorizing reasons as moral or non-moral. This tendency to divide reasons into categories of moral vs. non-moral leads us to give those that we label 'moral' pride of place and to assume that the category must be uniform. If we abandon these assumptions, then reasons of intimacy or friendship will no longer be so puzzling. We will then be able to see that all reasons, in the end, are importantly egocentric, and that deliberation must always proceed from an egocentric perspective.
Ethics Social Sciences Social Sciences - Other Topics

Details

Metrics

10 Record Views
Logo image