Journal article
Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
Games and economic behavior, Vol.6(3), pp.347-369
05/01/1994
DOI: 10.1006/game.1994.1021
Abstract
We present an experiment to test whether fairness alone can explain proposers′ willingness to make nontrivial offers in simple bargaining games. We examine two treatments: game (ultimatum or dictator) and pay (pay or no pay). The outcomes of the ultimatum and dictator games with pay are significantly different, implying that fairness, by itself, cannot explain the observed behavior. Doubling the amount of money available in games with pay does not affect these results. The outcomes of both games are replicable when players are paid, but the outcome of the ultimatum game is not replicable when players are not paid.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
- Creators
- Robert Forsythe - University of IowaJoel L. Horowitz - University of IowaN. E. Savin - University of IowaMartin Sefton - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Games and economic behavior, Vol.6(3), pp.347-369
- DOI
- 10.1006/game.1994.1021
- ISSN
- 0899-8256
- eISSN
- 1090-2473
- Number of pages
- 23
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 05/01/1994
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984963198702771
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