Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games

Russell Cooper; Douglas V. DeJong; Robert Forsythe; Thomas W. Ross

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Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games

Journal article

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Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games

Russell Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas W. Ross

The American economic review, Vol.83(5), pp.1303-1316

12/01/1993

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Abstract

This paper provides experimental evidence on forward induction as a refinement criterion. In the basic extensive form, one of the two players chooses to play a battle-of-the-sexes game or to receive a certain payoff. According to forward induction, choosing to play the game is a signal about intended action. Though the presence of the outside option changes play, we find only limited support for the forward-induction hypothesis. The effects of the outside option also reflect the creation of a focal point through the asymmetry created by offering the outside option to one of the two players.

Game Theory

Games

Battle of the sexes games

Cheap talk

Coordination games

Extensive form games

Focal points

Inductive reasoning

Military strategy

Nash equilibrium

Details

Title: Subtitle: Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games
Creators: Russell Cooper
Douglas V. DeJong
Robert Forsythe
Thomas W. Ross
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: The American economic review, Vol.83(5), pp.1303-1316
ISSN: 0002-8282
eISSN: 1944-7981
Publisher: American Economic Association
Number of pages: 14
Language: English
Date published: 12/01/1993
Academic Unit: Economics; Accounting
Record Identifier: 9984963121702771

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