Journal article
Full Implementation under Ambiguity
American economic journal. Microeconomics, Vol.13(1), pp.148-178
02/01/2021
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180184
Abstract
This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient conditions for implementation. As applications, we implement the set of ambiguous Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice functions, the maxmin core, the maxmin weak core, and the maxmin value.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Full Implementation under Ambiguity
- Creators
- Huiyi Guo - Texas A&M U.Nicholas C. Yannelis - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- American economic journal. Microeconomics, Vol.13(1), pp.148-178
- Publisher
- Amer Economic Assoc
- DOI
- 10.1257/mic.20180184
- ISSN
- 1945-7669
- eISSN
- 1945-7685
- Number of pages
- 31
- Grant note
- Ballard and Seashore Dissertation Fellowship from the University of Iowa
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 02/01/2021
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380535502771
Metrics
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