Journal article
Game theoretic approaches to some air pollution regulation problems
Socio-economic planning sciences, Vol.8(3), pp.141-147
01/01/1974
DOI: 10.1016/0038-0121(74)90005-6
Abstract
Several mathematical optimization models have recently been developed whose optimal solutions lead to selective abatement policies for the regulation of sources of pollutants in the atmosphere. These models seek to minimize total control costs while meeting ambient air quality standards throughout a region. Least cost solutions may be difficult to enforce and spawn inequities and conflicts among the polluters. In this paper we explore various cooperative n-person game theoretic concepts which involve dominance, stability, and comparisons of coalition excesses in order to aid the formulation of regulations related to given least cost solutions. A new weighting scheme of various coalitions is suggested involving the preferences of the population and polluters in the region and the regulatory agency itself. This scheme is one of several which responds to possible inequities which may stem from least cost solutions. © 1974.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Game theoretic approaches to some air pollution regulation problems
- Creators
- C. G. Bird - Washington State UniversityK. O. Kortanek - Washington State University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Socio-economic planning sciences, Vol.8(3), pp.141-147
- DOI
- 10.1016/0038-0121(74)90005-6
- ISSN
- 0038-0121
- eISSN
- 1873-6041
- Number of pages
- 7
- Grant note
- GK31.833 / National Science Foundation (http://data.elsevier.com/vocabulary/SciValFunders/100000001)
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 01/01/1974
- Academic Unit
- Business Analytics
- Record Identifier
- 9984963099302771
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