Journal article
Gaming Against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers
The American economic review, Vol.89(4), pp.781-804
09/01/1999
DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.4.781
Abstract
We examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in China, comparing behavior between: (i) students and managers with field experience with this situation, (ii) standard versus increased monetary incentives, and (iii) sessions conducted “in context,” making explicit reference to interactions between planners and managers, and those without any such references. The dynamics of play are similar across treatments with play only gradually, and incompletely, converging on a pooling equilibrium. A fivefold increase in incentives significantly increases initial levels of strategic play. Games played in context generated greater levels of strategic play for managers, with minimal impact on students. (JEL D23, D8, C92)
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Gaming Against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers
- Creators
- David J Cooper - Case Western Reserve UniversityJohn H Kagel - The Ohio State UniversityWei Lo - National Dong Hwa UniversityQing Liang Gu - Glorious Sun School of Business & Management, China Textile University, 1882 West Yan-An Road, Shanghai 200051, China.
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- The American economic review, Vol.89(4), pp.781-804
- DOI
- 10.1257/aer.89.4.781
- ISSN
- 0002-8282
- eISSN
- 1944-7981
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 09/01/1999
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984420945102771
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