Journal article
Health Insurance, Health Savings Accounts and Healthcare Utilization
Health economics, Vol.25(3), pp.357-371
03/2016
DOI: 10.1002/hec.3142
PMID: 25594149
Abstract
Assuming symmetric information, we show that a high-deductible health plan (HDHP) combined with a tax-favored health savings account (HSA) induces more savings and less treatment compared with a full coverage plan under reasonable risk preferences. Furthermore, a higher tax subsidy increases savings in any case but decreases medical utilization if and only if treatment expenses are above the deductible. A larger deductible increases savings but does not necessarily decrease healthcare utilization. Whether an HDHP/HSA combination is preferred over a full coverage contract depends on absolute risk aversion. A higher tax advantage increases the attractiveness of an HDHP/HSA combination, whereas the effects of changes in the deductible are ambiguous. The paper shows that a potential regulator needs to carefully set the size of the deductible as only in a certain corridor of the probability of sickness, its effect on aggregate healthcare costs are unambiguously favorable. Copyright (c) 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Health Insurance, Health Savings Accounts and Healthcare Utilization
- Creators
- Richard Peter - Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität MünchenSebastian Soika - Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität MünchenPetra Steinorth - St. John's University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Health economics, Vol.25(3), pp.357-371
- Publisher
- Wiley
- DOI
- 10.1002/hec.3142
- PMID
- 25594149
- ISSN
- 1057-9230
- eISSN
- 1099-1050
- Number of pages
- 15
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 03/2016
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Record Identifier
- 9984380440502771
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