Journal article
Health insurer monopsony power: the all-or-none model
Journal of health economics, Vol.21(2), pp.197-206
2002
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6296(01)00117-5
PMID: 11939238
Abstract
The textbook model of monopsony that is typically employed in analyzing health insurer monopsony power does not adequately describe the supply decision of physicians confronting a dominant health insurer. Rather than restricting purchases in order to extract a lower price for provider services, monopsonistic insurers are able to obtain discounts from providers without experiencing a decrease in quantity when physicians are forced to operate along their “all-or-none” supply curve. The welfare effects of the all-or-none model of monopsony are compared to those implied by the traditional model.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Health insurer monopsony power: the all-or-none model
- Creators
- Jill Boylston Herndon
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of health economics, Vol.21(2), pp.197-206
- DOI
- 10.1016/S0167-6296(01)00117-5
- PMID
- 11939238
- NLM abbreviation
- J Health Econ
- ISSN
- 0167-6296
- eISSN
- 1879-1646
- Publisher
- Elsevier B.V
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 2002
- Academic Unit
- Public Policy Center (Archive)
- Record Identifier
- 9984283853802771
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