Journal article
Hyperbolic Doubt, Cognitive Garbage, and the Regulae
Revue internationale de philosophie, Vol.n°290(4), p.449
2019
DOI: 10.3917/rip.290.0449
Abstract
Summary
There is reason to believe – and reason to think that Descartes believes – that clear and distinct perceptions are not easy to come by. Indeed, much of Descartes' corpus is a lamentation on the obstacles that are posed by embodiment and on the efforts that are required to work around it. So long as we are attached to a body, sensory distractions can keep us from having clear and distinct perceptions; they can also divert our attention from a clear and distinct perception that is underway. A seeming countercurrent in Descartes' epistemology is the view that in order to really know something we must not only have clearly and distinctly perceived it, but we must also have a clear and distinct perception of divine veracity by which to block the hyperbolic worry that our minds might be deceived about matters that are most evident to us. Descartes holds that it is possible for a human mind to converge on truths that are wholly indubitable and "stable and likely to last", though his views on embodiment suggest that nothing could ever be grasped quite so well. This paper argues that the Cartesian method for seeing hyperbolic doubt as an unmotivated confusion is not to have a clear and distinct perception of divine veracity ready at hand but to acquire an embodied habit of telling when a proposal (like hyperbolic doubt) is confused on its face.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Hyperbolic Doubt, Cognitive Garbage, and the Regulae
- Creators
- David Cunning
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Revue internationale de philosophie, Vol.n°290(4), p.449
- DOI
- 10.3917/rip.290.0449
- ISSN
- 0048-8143
- eISSN
- 2033-0138
- Language
- French
- Date published
- 2019
- Academic Unit
- Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984397948502771
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