Journal article
Import Penetration and Executive Compensation
The Review of financial studies, Vol.36(1), pp.281-316
12/19/2022
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhac020
Abstract
We first compare several measures of import penetration and find that total imports, tariffs, and exchange rates are endogenous, while imports from China are largely exogenous. Then we examine the effects of Chinese import penetration on executive compensation of U.S. firms. We document that Chinese import penetration reduces executives' stock grants and wealth-performance sensitivity, suggesting that competition mitigates agency problems and the need for conventional alignment mechanisms. Authors have furnished an , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Import Penetration and Executive Compensation
- Creators
- Erik Lie - University of IowaKeyang (Daniel) Yang - Washington State University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- The Review of financial studies, Vol.36(1), pp.281-316
- Publisher
- Oxford Univ Press
- DOI
- 10.1093/rfs/hhac020
- ISSN
- 0893-9454
- eISSN
- 1465-7368
- Number of pages
- 36
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 12/19/2022
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Record Identifier
- 9984380714902771
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