Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information

Leonidas C. Koutsougeras; Nicholas C. Yannelis

doi:10.1007/BF01212914

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Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information

Journal article

Peer reviewed

Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information

Leonidas C. Koutsougeras and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Economic theory, Vol.3(2), pp.195-216

06/1993

DOI: 10.1007/BF01212914

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Abstract

We analyse the coarse, the fine, and the private core allocation of an exchange economy with differential information. The basic questions that we address are whether the above concepts are: (i) coalitionally incentive compatible, i.e., does truthful revelation of information in each coalition occur; and (ii) taking into account the information superiority or information advantage of an agent. Moreover, the above three concepts are examined in the presence of externalities and a comparison and interpretation of all of these core notions is provided.

Economic agents

Economic analysis

Economic theory

Endowments

Information economy

Information intermediaries

Trade

Trade intermediaries

Urban economics

Utility functions

Details

Title: Subtitle: Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information
Creators: Leonidas C. Koutsougeras
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Economic theory, Vol.3(2), pp.195-216
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
DOI: 10.1007/BF01212914
ISSN: 0938-2259
eISSN: 1432-0479
Language: English
Date published: 06/1993
Academic Unit: Economics
Record Identifier: 9984380544502771

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