Journal article
Information Incentives and Contract Timing Patterns
International economic review (Philadelphia), Vol.31(3), pp.651-665
08/01/1990
DOI: 10.2307/2527167
Abstract
A prominent feature of wage contracting in the United States is the "bunched" timing pattern that is often associated with the process of pattern bargaining. The model describes the bunching of wage contracts as the equilibrium outcome of decentralized decisions in an economy composed of both competitive and monopolistically competitive product markets. Agents time their wage adjustment to take advantage of the information associated with the timing decisions of others; this information-based motive leads to staggered contracting. A bunching equilibrium requires the presence of heterogeneous product markets, and occurs because the information transmitted by contracting agents differs across the market structures.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Information Incentives and Contract Timing Patterns
- Creators
- Gary FethkeAndrew Policano
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- International economic review (Philadelphia), Vol.31(3), pp.651-665
- DOI
- 10.2307/2527167
- ISSN
- 0020-6598
- eISSN
- 1468-2354
- Publisher
- The Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania, and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association
- Number of pages
- 15
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 08/01/1990
- Academic Unit
- Business Analytics
- Record Identifier
- 9984963125802771
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