Journal article
Learning and transfer in signaling games
Economic theory, Vol.34(3), pp.415-439
03/01/2008
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0192-5
Abstract
We explore how learning to play strategically in one signaling game promotes strategic play in a related signaling game. Following convergence to a pooling equilibrium, payoffs are changed to only support separating equilibria. More strategic play is observed following the change in payoffs than for inexperienced subjects in control sessions, contrary to the prediction of a fictitious play learning model. Introducing a growing proportion of sophisticated learners, subjects who anticipate responders' behavior following the change in payoffs, enables the model to capture the positive cross-game learning observed in the data.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Learning and transfer in signaling games
- Creators
- David J. Cooper - Case Western Reserve UniversityJohn H. Kagel - The Ohio State University
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economic theory, Vol.34(3), pp.415-439
- Publisher
- Springer Nature
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00199-006-0192-5
- ISSN
- 0938-2259
- eISSN
- 1432-0479
- Number of pages
- 25
- Grant note
- 0832416 / Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences; National Science Foundation (NSF); NSF - Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences (SBE)
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 03/01/2008
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984420836402771
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