Journal article
Legitimacy, communication and leadership in the turnaround game
Management Science, Vol.61(11), pp.2627-2645
11/2015
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2021
Abstract
We study the effectiveness of leaders for inducing coordinated organizational change to a more efficient equilibrium, i.e., a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of randomly selected and elected leaders. While all interventions yield shifts to more efficient equilibria, communication from leaders has a greater effect than incentives. Moreover, leaders who are elected by followers are significantly better at improving their group’s outcome than randomly selected ones. The improved effectiveness of elected leaders results from sending more performance-relevant messages. Our results are evidence that the way in which leaders are selected affects their legitimacy and the degree to which they influence followers. Finally, we observed that a combination of factors— incentive increases and elected leaders—yield near universal turnarounds to full efficiency.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Legitimacy, communication and leadership in the turnaround game
- Creators
- Jordi Brandts - Institut d'Anàlisi EconòmicaDavid J Cooper - Florida State UniversityRoberto A Weber - University of Zurich
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Management Science, Vol.61(11), pp.2627-2645
- Publisher
- Institute for Operations Research and the Management Science
- DOI
- 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2021
- ISSN
- 0025-1909
- eISSN
- 1526-5501
- Language
- English
- Electronic publication date
- 12/22/2014
- Date published
- 11/2015
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984420943102771
Metrics
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