Journal article
MARKET POWER IN ORAL DOUBLE AUCTIONS
Economic inquiry, Vol.24(1), pp.107-123
01/1986
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1986.tb01800.x
Abstract
This paper reports the results of a series of oral‐double‐auction experiments in which some traders possess market power. A market is set up in which the configuration of the supply and demand curves leads to an asymmetry between buyers and sellers in their abilities to influence transactions prices. This market structure does not always lead to convergence to the competitive equilibrium price despite the competitive nature of the oral‐double‐auction institution. The nonconvergence occurs most frequently in the experiments involving experienced subjects.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- MARKET POWER IN ORAL DOUBLE AUCTIONS
- Creators
- CHARLES A HOLTLOREN W LANGANANNE P VILLAMIL
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Economic inquiry, Vol.24(1), pp.107-123
- Publisher
- Blackwell Publishing Ltd
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1986.tb01800.x
- ISSN
- 0095-2583
- eISSN
- 1465-7295
- Number of pages
- 17
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 01/1986
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984083208102771
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