Market Design, Manipulation, and Accuracy in Political Prediction Markets: Lessons from the Iowa Electronic Markets

Journal article

Peer reviewed

Joyce E. Berg and Thomas A. Rietz

PS, political science & politics, Vol.47(2), pp.293-296

04/01/2014

DOI: 10.1017/S1049096514000043

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Political Science

Social Sciences

Government & Law

Title: Subtitle: Market Design, Manipulation, and Accuracy in Political Prediction Markets: Lessons from the Iowa Electronic Markets
Creators: Joyce E. Berg - University of Iowa
Thomas A. Rietz - University of Iowa
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: PS, political science & politics, Vol.47(2), pp.293-296
Publisher: Cambridge Univ Press
DOI: 10.1017/S1049096514000043
ISSN: 1049-0965
eISSN: 1537-5935
Number of pages: 4
Language: English
Date published: 04/01/2014
Academic Unit: Finance; Accounting
Record Identifier: 9984380392902771

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