Journal article
Minority Representation in Multimember Districts
The American political science review, Vol.92(1), pp.127-144
03/01/1998
DOI: 10.2307/2585933
Abstract
Given the recent court rulings against racial gerrymandering, the effect of multimember district elections on minority representation is an important issue. We present a model of voting in double-member district elections with two majority candidates and one minority candidate and consider the voting equilibria under straight and cumulative voting. In straight voting, while an equilibrium always exists in which the two majority candidates are expected to win the two seats, minority candidates may be elected. In cumulative voting, minority candidate wins are also possible in equilibrium but are less likely when minority voters prefer one majority candidate over another. We then present experimental evidence showing that minority candidates win significantly more seats in cumulative than in straight voting elections. When minority voters perceive a substantial difference between the majority candidates, however, they are more likely to split their votes between the minority and majority candidates, winning fewer seats.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Minority Representation in Multimember Districts
- Creators
- Elisabeth R. Gerber - University of California, San DiegoRebecca B. Morton - Political ScienceThomas A. Rietz - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- The American political science review, Vol.92(1), pp.127-144
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- DOI
- 10.2307/2585933
- ISSN
- 0003-0554
- eISSN
- 1537-5943
- Number of pages
- 18
- Alternative title
- Minority Representation in Multimember Districts; American Political Science Review
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 03/01/1998
- Academic Unit
- Finance
- Record Identifier
- 9984380495502771
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