Journal article
Monetary policy and the timing of wage negotiations
Journal of monetary economics, Vol.19(1), pp.89-105
1987
DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(87)90030-4
Abstract
In a model of long-term labor contracts, the simultaneous determination of the pattern of contract negotiation and the pattern of monetary-policy intervention yields a Nash equilibrium in which agents allow a discretionary role for policy. The resulting pattern of negotiation depends on the stochastic nature of the system. When all disturbances are aggregate in nature, a synchronized pattern of negotiation is optimal regardless of the frequency of monetary-policy intervention. When both aggregate and relative disturbances affect the system, a pattern of bunched negotiations can result with the authority intervening at dates away from the negotiation dates. © 1987.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Monetary policy and the timing of wage negotiations
- Creators
- Gary Fethke - University of IowaAndrew Policano - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of monetary economics, Vol.19(1), pp.89-105
- DOI
- 10.1016/0304-3932(87)90030-4
- ISSN
- 0304-3932
- eISSN
- 1873-1295
- Number of pages
- 17
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 1987
- Academic Unit
- Business Analytics
- Record Identifier
- 9984962886002771
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