Journal article
Nash equilibrium in games with quasi-monotonic best-responses
Journal of economic theory, Vol.172, pp.220-246
11/01/2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.09.004
Abstract
This paper proposes a new general class of strategic games and develops an associated new existence result for pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. For a two-player game with scalar and compact action sets, existence entails that one reaction curve be increasing and continuous and the other quasi-increasing (i.e., not have any downward jumps). The latter property amounts to strategic quasi-complementarities. The paper provides a number of ancillary results of independent interest, including sufficient conditions for a quasi increasing argmax (or non-monotone comparative statics), and new sufficient conditions for uniqueness of fixed points. For maximal accessibility of the results, the main results are presented in a Euclidean setting. We argue that all these results have broad and elementary applicability by providing simple illustrations with commonly used models in economic dynamics and industrial organization. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Nash equilibrium in games with quasi-monotonic best-responses
- Creators
- Rabah Amir - University of IowaLuciano De Castro - University of Iowa
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Journal of economic theory, Vol.172, pp.220-246
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.jet.2017.09.004
- ISSN
- 0022-0531
- eISSN
- 1095-7235
- Number of pages
- 27
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 11/01/2017
- Academic Unit
- Economics
- Record Identifier
- 9984380554102771
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