Journal article
Neuroscience and the Multiple Realization of Cognitive Functions
Philosophy of science, Vol.77(3), pp.419-456
07/2010
DOI: 10.1086/652964
Abstract
Many empirically minded philosophers have used neuroscientific data to argue against the multiple realization of cognitive functions in existing biological organisms. I argue that neuroscientists themselves have proposed a biologically based concept of multiple realization as an alternative to interpreting empirical findings in terms of one-to-one structure-function mappings. I introduce this concept and its associated research framework and also how some of the main neuroscience-based arguments against multiple realization go wrong.
Details
- Title: Subtitle
- Neuroscience and the Multiple Realization of Cognitive Functions
- Creators
- Carrie Figdor
- Resource Type
- Journal article
- Publication Details
- Philosophy of science, Vol.77(3), pp.419-456
- DOI
- 10.1086/652964
- ISSN
- 0031-8248
- eISSN
- 1539-767X
- Publisher
- The University of Chicago Press
- Alternative title
- Multiple Realization
- Language
- English
- Date published
- 07/2010
- Academic Unit
- Iowa Neuroscience Institute; Philosophy
- Record Identifier
- 9984065470502771
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