Non-Symmetric Cardinal Value Allocations

Allen J. Scafuri; Nicholas C. Yannelis

doi:10.2307/1913510

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Non-Symmetric Cardinal Value Allocations

Journal article

Peer reviewed

Non-Symmetric Cardinal Value Allocations

Allen J. Scafuri and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Econometrica, Vol.52(6), pp.1365-1368

11/01/1984

DOI: 10.2307/1913510

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Abstract

It is shown that cardinal value allocations may fail to be symmetric. Specifically, agents with identical preferences and identical endowments can be treated very differently at a cardinal value allocation. This casts further doubt on the interpretation of the weights as "endogenous utility comparisons."

Budget allocation

Economic theory

Economic value

Endowments

Game theory

Utility functions

Details

Title: Subtitle: Non-Symmetric Cardinal Value Allocations
Creators: Allen J. Scafuri
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Resource Type: Journal article
Publication Details: Econometrica, Vol.52(6), pp.1365-1368
Publisher: The Econometric Society
DOI: 10.2307/1913510
ISSN: 0012-9682
eISSN: 1468-0262
Language: English
Date published: 11/01/1984
Academic Unit: Economics
Record Identifier: 9984380748702771

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